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Extended Abstract
In our attempts to understand the evolution of biological,
cognitive and cultural systems, critical questions arise con-
cerning the origin of meaning. I argue that the key to success
in attempts to create computational systems that exhibit the
same capacities as their natural counterparts to evolve new
and creative ways of interacting with their environment, be-
yond that which is simply “programmed into” the system
from the start, lies in answering these questions.
The nature of the problem is laid bare when we consider
the origin and evolution of life. A fundamental question is
this: how is it possible for organisms, that follow their own
goals and behave according to their own rules, to emerge
in a world governed by the laws of physics and chemistry?
More generally, how can agents and agency emerge in a sys-
tem governed by universal laws? And even once our agents
have emerged, how can the evolutionary process produce
new agents that interact with their environment through pre-
viously unexploited modalities? That is, how can new sen-
sors and actuators emerge (such as the origin of a magnetic
sense in migratory birds, or the ability of some species of
fish to generate electric fields), where the modalities upon
which they act were not exploited in earlier species?
This second question may perhaps have more significance
for attempts to build artificial creative systems; in the bi-
ological world the solution is largely related to the fact
that the organs and structures that comprise organisms pos-
sess multi-functional properties across different modalities
(e.g. strength, elasticity, electrical conductivity, sensitivity
to light, etc.), and that a structure evolved for one function
may turn out (initially by accident) to have beneficial prop-
erties in a different modality which may then be exploited by
evolution (a phenomenon known variously in the biological
literature as exaptation, cooption or preadaptation). How-
ever, when we create artificial systems, particularly software
systems, the building blocks of the system are not generally
multi-functional, and this is one of the reasons why the evo-
lution of new sensors and actuators has become an important
issue in this context.1
1See (Dautenhahn et al., 2001) for a special issue of the Artifi-
However, the solution to the problem of evolving new
forms of interaction requires more than just using multi-
functional building blocks. To make progress in this area,
and on the more fundamental question of the origin of
agency, requires a shift of focus away from the properties
of individual agents, to consider the dynamic nature of the
environment and the relationship between agents and envi-
ronment. In a previous paper I set out an argument for mod-
elling agents and environment as a single dynamical system
(Taylor, 2004) [see also (Taylor, 2001)]. The argument was
influenced by the biosemiotics literature, and, in particular,
the work of Howard Pattee; biosemiotics offers important
insights for addressing these issues.2
Pattee argues that the distinction between the material
and symbolic aspects of living organisms, seen as an exam-
ple of the more general epistemological distinction between
laws and initial conditions, is a defining feature of life, and
also a necessary condition for open-ended evolution (Pattee,
1995a; Pattee, 1995b). He explains the relationship between
the two as follows:
Writing symbols is a time-dependent dynamic ac-
tivity that leaves time-independent structure or record.
. . . Symbols are read when these structures re-enter the
dynamics of laws as constraints. Any highly evolved
formal symbol system may be viewed as a particularly
versatile collection of initial conditions or constraints,
often stored in a memory, producing significant or func-
tional behavior that is usefully described by locally se-
lected rules rather than physical laws. . . . [A]ll sym-
bol systems must have material embodiments that obey
physical laws. But for the reasons just stated, the law-
ful description of symbols, even though correct in all
details, can reveal no significance. (Pattee, 1995b)
The symbols recorded on the genome ultimately acquire se-
cial Life Journal devoted to the topic of sensor evolution.
2Also of interest here is work on phenomenology and existential
philosophy that asks similar questions from the point of view of
the agent rather than the system; that is, how does an agent learn to
distinguish itself from its environment? See, for example, (Jonas,
1966; Macmurray, 1957).
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Figure 1: Semantic Closure: Closing the loop between geno-
type, phenotype and environment
mantics in an organism in the context of the survival value
of the dynamics that they initiate (i.e. natural selection of
phenotypes). It is this autonomous structure-function self-
referent organisation that is entailed in Pattee’s term “seman-
tic closure” (Figure 1).
This perspective, then, sees organisms as entities whose
phenotypes are embedded within an environment viewed as
a dynamical system, and whose genotypes interact with the
environment by specifying constraints3 upon its dynamics,
thereby generating the phenotypes. That is, the abiotic envi-
ronment has its own dynamics and self-organisational prop-
erties; genotypes act to “sculpt” these pre-existing dynamics
by supplying constraints. From this point of view, the most
important distinction is not between organisms and their abi-
otic environment, but rather between the environment as a
whole (including organism phenotypes) and organism geno-
types. It is the relatively time-independent genotypes, by
supplying local constraints to the dynamics of the environ-
ment, that reify phenotypes as distinct entities within the en-
vironment.
In (Taylor, 2004) I presented initial results from a model
based upon this perspective, and demonstrated simple ex-
amples of the evolution of new sensors and effectors, and of
genome-regulated self-stablising behaviour (i.e. an example
of an historical system as described below).
I argue that this perspective is crucial if we are to un-
derstand the origin of agency. However, we can go further
and generalise this picture. In so doing, we may find useful
connections and analogies between biological, cognitive and
cultural systems, and thereby gain a better understanding of
how creativity may be instilled into artificial systems.
Pattee’s concept of semantic closure is related to what (Di
Paolo, 2001) has referred to as an historical process (Fig-
3Throughout this paper the general term ‘constraint’ is used to
cover initial conditions, constraints and boundary conditions. For
further discussion of these concepts, see (Pattee, 1995a).
Figure 2: An Historical System
ure 2).4 This describes a situation in which the constraints
of the system initiate dynamics, and the dynamics may feed
back to affect (select or modify) the constraints. In a situa-
tion such as this, the system may exhibit behaviour which
cannot be explained purely by the laws of dynamics, but
only with reference to the particular history through which
the system has evolved from its initial to current state. This
mutual interaction (or “creative dance”) thereby brings forth
novel forms of behaviour, the meaning of which can only be
understood by considering how the dance itself has evolved
over time.
This general description can be applied not only to the ori-
gin of meaning in biological systems as described by Pattee,
but to other systems too. Examples of systems where this
view may also be of use include:
• Human cognition. The embodied mind literature, e.g.
(Varela et al., 1993) recognises the mutual relationship
between cognition and processes in the environment. The
extended mind hypothesis goes further to suggest that ex-
ternal props to cognition, such as the written word, are
so closely coupled with internal cognitive processes that
cognitive systems should properly be regarded as com-
prising both the internal and the external components
working together (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). The ex-
tended mind hypothesis could be cast as a mutual rela-
tionship between symbols in the environment and the dy-
namic processes of the brain. As such it can be seen as
fitting into the general description of an historical system.
• Human cultural traditions, institutions and artefacts. The
historical system view may be extended to cover not only
human cognition, but cultural evolution as well. The ar-
chaeologist Colin Renfrew has recently argued that hu-
man cultural evolution can only be understood by consid-
eration of the particular trajectories through which spe-
cific cultures have evolved, and by consideration of how
4Similar concepts appear much earlier in the literature, such as
Ashby’s description of an ultrastable system (Ashby, 1952).
2
institutional facts arise through the mutual interaction be-
tween cultural symbols and engagement with the mate-
rial world (Renfrew, 2007). This view clearly has strong
similarities to the general picture of an historical sys-
tem outlined above. However, when considering cultural
evolution, it is also important to ask why other species,
such as chimpanzees, exhibit some capacity for the cul-
tural transmission of behaviour, but nevertheless seem to
lack the capacity for building more complex behaviours
on top of simpler learned behaviours, and therefore fail to
show cumulative cultural evolution (Marshall-Pescini and
Whiten, 2008).
Consideration of the extent to which such analogies hold
between these very different systems, and the commonalities
and differences between them, will surely lead to a much
deeper understanding of the generative causes of novelty
and creativity, and the origin of meaning, in natural systems.
And such understanding will suggest ways in which we may
create artificial systems with a much deeper capacity for cre-
ativity than exhibited by previous attempts.
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